Distinguished Co-facilitators,

Since I am taking the floor for the first time this session, let me begin by expressing how profoundly my delegation commends your leadership. We support your effort to make this intergovernmental process deliver a robust outcome document for the UN Summit in September which will adopt the Post-2015 Development Agenda.

We are grateful for your hard work, which has produced the Zero Draft that is before us. We believe that this draft, with adjustments from discussions in this session, can become a solid basis for our negotiations, to create a transformative and universal agenda we can all aspire to.

In this regard, my delegation aligns itself with the statements delivered over the past five days on behalf of the Group of 77 and China, LDCs, and LLDCs. These statements capture both the concerns and aspirations of my delegation. I am sure you will accommodate all those elements to produce a draft on which we can begin negotiations and ensure countries like Nepal are not left behind.

Having said that, Mr. Co-facilitator, I wish to touch on an aspect of the whole exercise that has not found a place in the Zero Draft, but which I believe we should not leave unsaid. While it may not have much to do with the post-2015 development agenda per se, it should be built into this agenda so as to not repeat the same mistake 15 years from now. And so I wish to talk about the post-2030 development agenda.

Co-facilitators, at the open working group on SDGs, at the revitalization debates, at the UNGA debate on the UNSG’s report, and in many other
relevant UN system fora and side events, and during various relevant bilateral meetings, my delegation has highlighted the importance of timely and systematic preparations—not only in the run up to the conferences producing outcome documents, but also to ensure the stakeholders have a sense of ownership over the document from the beginning so that the implementation of those outcome documents could begin at the national level without delay.

Let me briefly explain.

The experience of most LDCs, and the majority of developing countries, shows that several years are lost, in almost every case, before the actual implementation of the agreed programs of action. Five years were lost before the Brussels Program of Action was integrated into the national mechanisms for implementation of most LDCs. In the results, the loss of five years of a ten year program of action is very visible. And the same was true for the MDGs. For the Istanbul POA, too, there was a significant loss of time.

There is a consistent reason for this: the failure to connect the follow up and review mechanism to the next phase in a continuing process of development. Ideally, the sub-national and national level debates on progress in development would precede the global exercise of review and follow up. The outcomes of those debates would inform global deliberations to reach internationally agreed goals and targets. This is how the bottom-up approach to global planning of development should work.

There is a very clear benefit to such a process. When globally agreed goals and targets or agenda (in this case the SDGs and PTDA) are taken to the state level, there would already be a sense of ownership over the process and the goals and agenda among all stakeholders—among politicians, academia, media and development practitioners. This eases the integration of the global agenda into national mechanisms for implementation (such as special sectoral plans, or general periodic development plans, or annual budgets) through the government and parliamentary processes. The sub-national exercise helps sensitise the sub-national leaders, many of whom are elected to the national parliaments every few years.
The periods of development plans or even budget cycles are not the same in all countries. So a cushion period is required between the finalization of the agenda and the commencement of their implementation at national levels. When there is no such cushion period—for example when we have to finalise the post-2015 development agenda in September 2015, to begin implementation on the 1st of January 2016—the process is not pragmatic. The negotiation would have ideally started much earlier, and the agenda should have been finalized at least a year in advance so that the national and sub-national programs of action could be prepared, and budgetary provisions made for their implementation.

We have missed the opportunity to do this for the post-2015 development agenda. But my delegation believes something should be done to correct this shortcoming, at least when we start the final follow-up and review process, and prepare for the post-2030 development agenda. My delegation sees wisdom in incorporating, into the follow-up section of the present zero draft, a provision to allow this.

We could say that five years before the present post-2015 agenda period is over—that is, in 2025—a final round of evaluation of the progress would begin at national, regional, and global levels; and in 2027, the process of developing the post-2030 development agenda would begin, with a view to finalizing such an agenda in 2029 September which would then be implemented beginning in January 2031.

Such an arrangement would do a great service in putting emphasis on implementation with a seamless transition between the development agenda periods.

I thought I should share this as food for thought, at least for the post-2030 period. My delegation would not insist on the specific years and formulations but will continue reminding all for the collective wisdom to adequately embrace this concern.

I thank you.