Speaking points Goals and Targets

Co-Facilitators,

I’d like to start by aligning the UK with the statement by the EU on behalf of the EU and its member states.

Co-facilitators, as the EU made very clear, our strong preference would be to accept the 20 target revisions that you proposed as a package.

However, we also understand that some member states have concerns with specific targets and, as the EU has said, we are ready to engage in a more detailed discussion.

For example, we can see how some of the proposed revisions might be problematic such as target 6.6, which would reduce the ambition of Aichi target 14. And we also some concerns about the proposed revision for 15.2.

At the same time, replacing all the xs and other proposed revisions are important. For example:

- On target 14c we can accept the alternative language proposal stemming from the constructive informal discussions held last week.
- We support the technical tweak proposed to bring target 8.7 in line with international agreements by including language on modern slavery.
- On target 17.2, several EU member states already provide 0.7% of GNI as official development assistance. Several EU member states are providing 0.2% of GNI or more to LDCs. And we note that the EU has already undertaken to meet collectively 0.2% of GNI in ODA for LDCs within the time frame of this Agenda.

As we said, our strong preference is for the package, but we are willing to engage on the detail. I hope other groups can indicate similar flexibility, so that we, together, can assist you, co-facilitators, in finding a way forward.

Co-facilitators, you have in the annex also suggested new targets revisions that reference land-locked developing countries. As the EU noted, including these revisions would take us beyond the agreed, limited scope for technical proofing. We suggest that, once this room has agreed on how to handle the 20 revisions that you proposed according to a specific set of criteria, we could then assess if new criteria for revising targets should be brought into the discussion.

Finally, we support the short introduction to this section as it stands in paras 56 to 58.

Finally, as the EU and many others have said, the Chapeau text duplicates text already in the outcome document: including the Chapeau in full would only lead to repetition and confusion. However, if some member states feel that there are specific issues in that
Chapeau that are not yet adequately covered in the text (and the EU mentioned democratic governance in that regard) we stand ready to engage in finding a solution, as indeed we do on all aspects of the text.

Thank you.