The Making of the Millennium Development Goals: Human Development Meets Results-based Management In an Imperfect World

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Abstract

This paper argues that two ideas – human development and results-based management – have been particularly significant in shaping the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). These are unlikely intellectual bedfellows, but by charting the evolution of the MDGs their many influences are demonstrated. However, ideas are only one of the factors shaping the MDGs and the interests of many different actors are revealed in this account. At times the ideas of human development and results-based management were pursued but, when they challenge the interests of powerful groups or nations, their principles are compromised or assiduously avoided. With the wisdom of hindsight the relative coherence of the MDGs seems remarkable, given the processes from which they emerged. Perhaps the ‘Hiding Hand’ that Albert Hirschman identified 40 years ago guides some elements of global public policy over the long term.

Keywords – Millennium Development Goals, International Development Goals, global poverty, human development, results-based management, United Nations

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1. Introduction

The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) are the world’s biggest promise – a global agreement to reduce poverty and human deprivation at historically unprecedented rates through collaborative multilateral action. They differ from all other global promises for poverty reduction in their comprehensive nature and the systematic efforts taken to specify, finance, implement, monitor and advocate them. While many different ideas have influenced the ‘final’ form and content of the MDGs, two specific ideas, human development and results-based management, are identified as having particular significance. However, the ways in which these ideas influenced the evolution of the MDGs has been mediated by many different political interests.

**Human development** has become a central idea in international development since the early 1990s. It posits that human beings are the ends as well as the means of development, challenging the focus of many economists and policymakers on *per capita* economic growth. It has encouraged a focus on the poor and poorest and the prioritisation of capability enhancing services (such as food security, education and health). It justifies a multidimensional conceptualisation of human well-being and poverty (Qizilbash, 2006), although there are heated debates about the exact dimensions of human development (Alkire, 2002; Clark, 2002). The works of Paul Streeten et al (1981), Mahbub ul Haq (1995) and Amartya Sen (1999) are seen as seminal to this concept. The UNDP’s *Human Development Reports* have been highly effective in mobilising a constituency promoting human development.

**Results-based management (RBM)**, or performance management, has been central to efforts to improve public service delivery since the 1980s and was highlighted in Osborne and Gaebler’s (1992) influential book *Reinventing Government*. RBM is a ‘strategy aimed at achieving important changes in the way government agencies operate with improving performance (achieving better results) as the central orientation… a key component is the process of objectively measuring how well an agency is meeting its stated goals or objectives’ (Binnendijk, 2001, p. 3). This encourages a focus on identifying and continuously monitoring goals, targets and indicators. These should be SMART – stretching, measurable, agreed, realistic and time-limited. This focus on ‘measurables’ leads to a reduced interest in difficult to measure goals, such as human rights, participation and democracy.

The main objective of the paper is to deepen the understanding of the complex ways in which ideas and interests have interacted to shape the form and content of the MDGs. In its conclusion, the paper argues that the MDGs are surprisingly coherent, given the processes and influences out of which they developed. Perhaps Hirschman’s (1967) ‘Hiding Hand’ guides elements of global public policy opening opportunities for human creativity to improve the human condition in ways that are not anticipated. However, analysing whether the MDGs are a great advance that will reduce poverty or a *cul-de-sac* is a task reserved for future papers.

2. Analytical framework: histories of ideas and global public policy

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2 See Locke and Latham (1990) and Heinrich (2002) for reviews. Results-based management is a sub-field of a wider and more theorised body of work, new public management (Minogue, Polidano and Hulme, 1998).
The framework for this paper is drawn from several literatures. Taking advantage of Weiss and Carayannis’ (2001) work, it uses insights from institutional approaches, expert and activist group frameworks and constructivist writers. In addition, it uses ideas from the emerging field of global public policy.

From an institutional perspective (e.g. Goldstein and Keohane, 1993) the paper examines the way in which key actors (organisations and states) shape policy and the policy preferences of other actors. The paper views international relations between states in terms of ‘complex interdependence’ (Keohane and Milner 1996). While many actors have some power, the paper views the US, the world’s only superpower, as being in a unique position. On occasions it can behave as a G1.

Drawing on expert and activist group approaches (e.g. Haas, 1992; Keck and Sikkink, 1998), the paper highlights the role of scientific elites (such as poverty measurement experts at the World Bank), epistemic communities (such as the International Coalition on Women’s Health) and social movements (such as the women’s and environmental movements). The latter have played a crucial role in ‘multiply[ing] the channels of access to international debates (Keck and Sikkink, 1998, p. 3) and engaging the media and the public. This ranges from protests at G7/8 meetings and organising parallel events alongside UN conferences to, most recently, becoming formal players at the 2005 World Summit.

The third literature drawn from is ‘constructivist’ (e.g. Ruggie, 1998), viewing politics as socially constructed so that actors (leaders, policymakers, organisations, states) can change their values and norms and, consequently, their strategies and policies. This is not to argue that actors do not have material interests. Rather, it is to argue that the interactions between actors can change values so that material conditions and relative power do ‘not cast in concrete’ the behaviour of any actor (Weiss and Carayannis, 2001, p. 31).

Finally, the paper draws on the ‘policy process’ literature (e.g. Lindblom, 1959; Clay and Schaffer, 1984) and the emerging field of global public policy (Hulme 2008). Two insights are drawn from this. First, the policy processes surrounding the formulation, agreement and implementation of the MDGs are viewed as an incremental and on-going process of negotiation and bargaining with no clear start or clear phases or precise end. While the key actors present policy as an outcome of a linear-rational process based on scientific analysis and weighing up evidence, the real processes they are engaged in are quite different. No leader or agency is ‘in control’ and ‘…often serendipity, contingency and chance are important elements in policy change’ (Keeley and Scoones, 2003, p. 34). The second insight relates to the concept of a ‘global agora’ (Stone, 2006) – the dynamic but poorly defined political space in which global public policies, like the MDGs, are negotiated.

3. A brief history of the MDGs3: phase 1 – antecedents and the UN summits

(a) Antecedents

The idea of a dramatic attempt to eradicate or reduce global poverty has antecedents that go back to the mid-twentieth century: the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR); the Development Decade of the 1960s; the many UN summits of the

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3 For more detail see Hulme (2008).
second half of the twentieth century; and, books, reports and associated advocacy exercises on the issue (e.g. Galbraith, 1979; Myrdal, 1970). With the exception of the UDHR none of these moved much beyond the ‘aspirational’ stage.

Around 1980, with the arrival of Reagan and Thatcher, the intellectual ascendancy of neo-liberal ideas and the informal shifting of responsibility (and authority) for reducing poverty from the UN to the IFIs; the idea of a concerted multilateral effort at global poverty reduction stalled. Fortunately, at least for the MDGs, this counter-revolution did not stamp out all alternative thinking. By the late 1980s senior figures in the UN system were laying plans for a new generation of global summits.

(b) UN summitry returns

1990 marked a watershed in the evolution of ideas about poverty reduction. Against the backdrop of the end of the Cold War it saw the World Bank’s *World Development Report 1990*, acknowledging the need for economic reform to be accompanied by social policies. Even more significantly the first of the UNDP’s *Human Development Reports* was published. This made the idea of human development accessible to a wider group of professionals and to the serious media and gave social activists a relatively coherent framework from which to argue for policy change. 1990 was also the year of the World Summit for Children in New York, to which the processes leading to the MDGs can be traced back.

The World Summit for Children achieved its identified goals of mobilising public support and political commitment and setting concrete targets to improve the prospects of the world’s children. In addition, it re-energised and re-activated the idea that global summits could produce concrete improvements in human welfare. While some summits might be caricatured as glorified talking shops, Jim Grant’s leadership and careful planning of the Children’s Summit, along with the implementation of its goals, showed that this did not have to be the case.

The next summit, the Earth Summit at Rio in 1992, was a vibrant event raising public awareness of the links between the environment and development. It ensured that environmental sustainability or sustainable development had to be a component of any global strategy. However, it also exposed the North-South divide on how to manage global environmental problems and the USA’s reluctance to lead on this issue.

The 1993 World Conference on Human Rights in Vienna reaffirmed the principles underpinning UN activity and advanced the recognition of the rights of women. But, by its very nature, it steered clear of generating the measurables outputs demanded by results-based management. It provided overarching principles for what would eventually become the MDGs but not ‘goals’ for action.

The International Conference on Population and Development (ICPD) in Cairo in 1994 had much greater significance for the processes of MDG evolution. The agreements it reached, following heated debates between government officials, professionals, social activists and religious groups, would generate more backroom negotiations and deals than any other MDG item. The ICPD departed radically from the population control and family planning agendas of earlier conferences. Its plan of action focused on reproductive rights for all, with time bound targets for reductions in child, infant and maternal mortality and access to reproductive health services. This worried conservative Islamic countries, the Vatican and conservative Christian groups.
The peak year for UN summity was 1995 with the World Summit on Social Development in Copenhagen and the UN Fourth World Conference on Women in Beijing six months later. The Social Summit was crucial for the MDGs as a global consensus was reached that poverty reduction was the priority goal for development (UNDP, 1997, p. 108). It approved the target of eradicating income poverty ($1 a day poverty as it came to be known) by 2015 and reaffirmed the agreements reached at the Children's Summit and the ICPD. Implicitly it drew on the idea of human development and viewed poverty as being multi-dimensional. While the radical Left saw this as a sell out (Saith, 2006) – an acceptance of global capitalism – for the centre Left and centre Right this was a ‘consensus’. The agreement at Copenhagen had particular impact and legitimacy as 117 heads of state and government attended it – the largest meeting of ‘heads’ there had ever been.\(^4\)

In the same year the Women’s Summit at Beijing – driven by the women’s movement – reaffirmed the goals of gender equality and women’s empowerment. Many delegates saw the time as ripe for ambitious strategies of empowerment and social transformation (Eyben, 2006). However, the energy and drive of the conference was not matched by its impact on global goal-setting exercises. Its focus was more on human rights than the measurables that results-based management favoured. The fact that it was the second conference that year also proved disastrous: only two heads of state attended Beijing.

UN summits continued in the latter half of the 1990s but many observers report ‘summit fatigue’ setting in. The agora for global goal setting was about to shift from these vast and diverse UN jamborees to much smaller formalised meetings centred on Paris – mainly of men from industrialised countries. This was not part of any grand plan. It was just that in Paris there were a group of agencies that needed a set of global goals to help tackle their organisational problems, even if they did not yet know this.

**4. A brief history of the MDGs: Phase 2 – the DAC takes the lead**

**(a) From summits to lists**

In the mid-1990s most aid agencies had a big problem. With the Cold War over, their budgets as a share of GDP were declining and the total level of official development assistance (ODA) was in long term decline. For the donor club, the OECD’s Development Assistance Committee (DAC), these were serious problems. Ministers of International Development and the bureaucrats heading aid agencies found themselves increasingly marginalised. The atmosphere at the Chateau de la Muette, for the DAC high level meeting (HLM) of May 1995, was gloomy but no-one had a clear idea of what to do.

The European Union (under the French Presidency) proposed setting up a Groupe de reflexion to review the future of development aid and the role of the DAC. Jan Pronk, the highly-respected Netherlands Minister, supported this but ‘the meeting ended with support for the idea but with no implementation plan’ (Bradford, 2006, p. 2). Then serendipity intervened.\(^5\) As Colin Bradford, the US representative, crossed the car park Jan Pronk was pulling out. Bradford waved for him to stop. Through the car window he asked Pronk whether it would be a good idea to push for the launch of

\(^4\) A noticeable absentee was President Clinton. US reticence about the UN’s social development agenda was not confined to Republican constituencies.

\(^5\) This is not to suggest that structural forces were not operating. Merely that a chance event was needed to trigger the process that would lead the DAC into action.
the *Groupe de reflexion*. Pronk agreed so Bradford went back into the Chateau to talk to Jim Michel, chair of the meeting. Michel agreed and three weeks later the *Groupe de reflexion* was launched.

The *Groupe* met several times over the next year. Early on it asked DAC staff to draw up a list of UN summit declarations and pull these together into something more coherent. Unexpectedly, this listing became a focus for the *Groupe*. The drawing up of lists of targets had become a common device in the public services of OECD members, as their governments had adopted RBM.\(^6\) It appealed to the development agencies of the US, UK, Germany and Norway which were already using ‘logical frameworks’. It is important to note the quite different cultural context of DAC *Groupe* meetings compared to UN summits. The DAC debates about what should be listed fell within DAC frames of reference – aid, resource constraints, projects, policies and programmes. Human rights and democracy could be listed as desirable ‘qualitative factors’, but goals had to be narrower and measurable.

The listing exercise led to discussions amongst *Groupe* members about what should be included. A particular issue was the initial enthusiasm of the UK and Japanese delegations for a sole focus on income poverty reduction\(^7\) (through economic growth). They argued that a single goal would be better than a multi-dimensional list. Human development ideas strengthened the argument that a broad set of goals was needed for any serious assault on poverty. In the end a compromise was reached: the DAC document would be a listing but it would be headed by ‘economic well-being’ to ensure that the importance of economic growth was clear. This goal would focus on a global goal for income poverty reduction, the ‘social development’ goals would be subsumed under a single heading and environmental sustainability came third.

In May 1996 the DAC launched *Shaping the 21\(^{st}\) Century: The Contribution of Development Co-operation*. The final document was 20 pages long but attention focused on its seven ‘International Development Goals’ (IDGs)\(^8\) (Appendix 1). The IDGs received broadsheet media attention for a few days. Their main impacts depended on how they filtered back to the OECD countries that had agreed them and the responses of other organisations. Formally, within the OECD they made good progress. They were endorsed at several OECD ministerial meetings and by the G7 in 1996, 1997 and 1998 (Bradford 2002, p. 5). However, in many of the OECD member countries the document did not appear to have much traction. The ‘like minded’ group of progressive donors (Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway and Sweden) took the agreement seriously – indeed, literally. But they were already pursuing IDG type policies and had limited leverage over more powerful donors (USA, Japan, UK and France) and multilateral institutions.

In developing countries the IDGs had little or no recognition or resonance. This was a document produced entirely by rich countries and promises of ‘partnership’ sounded like standard aid agency rhetoric. Besides, the most powerful agencies that poorer countries had to engage with were the World Bank and IMF, not bilateral donors.

The responses of the major multilaterals varied. For the UN the report and the IDGs had significance (see next section). The IDGs registered in several parts of the

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\(^6\) See Binnendijk (2001) for a review of donor experience.

\(^7\) Colin Bradford of USAID and Phil Evans of DFID both identify the Japanese as arguing for this narrow focus. However, by mid-1996 the Japanese Government was keen to promote a set of goals that was broader than the IDGs (Sakiko Fukuda-Parr, June 2007).

\(^8\) There are only six bullet points as maternal and child mortality reduction are merged.
World Bank, especially the Poverty Unit of PREM where staff, influenced by Amartya Sen's work and the *Human Development Reports*, were pushing for the Bank to see poverty as multi-dimensional rather than purely in income/consumption terms\(^9\). The IDGs barely registered at the IMF.

The responses of NGOs varied depending on their goals and ideological orientation. Broad-based development NGOs could take some satisfaction in an agenda that incorporated ‘social development’. However, many of the actions that were within the control of OECD members – increased aid, debt forgiveness, fairer trade – were not part of the targets. For more radical NGOs and the emerging networks of anti-capitalist and anti-globalisation groups then the IDGs were just rhetoric – capitalism trying to mask its dependence on the exploitation of labour and the environment.

(b) The UN and the IDGs

From the UN and its agencies – so heavily involved in organising the summits and conferences from which the IDGs were drawn – there were various responses. It could take satisfaction in DAC advocating so many UN Summit agreements. But was DAC taking control of a UN agenda, with rich country political concerns determining what could and could not be put on the list? *The Human Development Report 1997* may provide some general insights into UN sentiment towards the IDGs. Chapter 6 covers similar terrain to *Shaping the 21st Century* but has quite different emphases\(^10\).

The *HDR* promotes a human rights approach to human development. DAC’s approach is narrower and more akin to basic needs. The UN’s primary audiences are its member states (189 countries at that time) and influential interest groups and NGOs. For DAC the target audiences are its member states (20 rich countries) and public opinion in those countries. With overlapping but different memberships, and differing dynamics within those memberships, each organisation faced different constraints on formulating global policy. The twin track process – an OECD list and a UN list – that would lead to the possibility of two different sets of global poverty reduction goals in March 2001 was about to start.

(c) Selling the IDGs in the Rich World: Clare Short and the Utstein Group

The political and public influence of the IDGs, and of UN Summit declarations, might have slowed down in 1997 but for three factors. First came elections and party politics in the UK; second was the coincidence of four Northern European women being ministers for international development at the same time; and third, was the approaching UN Millennium Assembly.

In May 1997 New Labour swept into power in the UK beginning an era when the UK would become a major player in international development. The appointment of Clare Short as the Secretary of State for International Development filled this elevated post with a powerful and ‘larger than life’ figure. Her personal power was strengthened by her iconic position within New Labour as a left winger committed to making New Labour successful. The political and administrative context around Clare Short and her Department for International Development (DFID) was also very positive. The wider environment was also supportive, as the UK’s major NGOs had sensitised the British public to international development and global poverty reduction.

\(^9\) Michael Walton (12.06.07)

\(^10\) One should not read too much into this textual comparison, but it does reveal important differences in concepts and sub-goals that would shape later negotiations.
Short came to her job with a list of four things to do quickly: (i) rapidly produce a White Paper; (ii) craft a policy narrative that would mobilise public support for development; (iii) identify DFID’s targets for the RBM systems New Labour introduced to the civil service; and (iv) find a way of shifting the government’s development focus from UK foreign aid projects to changing the policies (development, trade, military, environmental) of the big players. The IDGs were to have significance for all of these.

She reports a Damascene moment when she first found the IDGs (which she and DFID term the International Development Targets or IDTs):

… Shaping the 21st Century…drew together the recommendations of the great UN conferences of the 1990's… and suggested that a great advance was possible if we focussed on the systematic reduction of poverty… I decided I would work to make this the framework for our development efforts… (Short, 2004, pp. 53-4).

She used the IDGs in four main ways. They provided the basis for her first White Paper. She sold the IDGs to her cabinet colleagues, New Labour and the UK public and fed them to the media. They were re-engineered into the first set of targets for DFID’s Public Service Agreement with the Treasury. Finally, Short hawked them around the world: ‘We believed that the targets [IDGs] could move the world to start to implement the grand declarations it agreed on through the UN…’ (Short, 2004, pp. 88-9). She also ‘sold’ them to African and Asian heads of state and ministers and was surprised when some of these were not enthusiastic about this ‘rich nation’ product.

Short did more than any other individual over 1997 and 1998 to promote the IDGs. But, she also had some key allies in the informal Utstein Group of four female international development ministers. They operated very effectively at G7/8, OECD and UN meetings and summits amplifying the policy narrative – the IDGs are the way to rapidly reduce global poverty.

5. A brief history of the MDGs: Phase 3 – The UN returns to centre stage

(a) Preparing for the Millennium Assembly: ‘We the Peoples’

The UN now re-entered the game of global target setting through planning for the Millennium Assembly of the United Nations, to be held at New York in September 2000. The UN’s new Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, was keen to make global poverty reduction central to the UN agenda and avoid being driven along by peacekeeping, security and emergency issues (Traub, 2006, p. 147).

In May 1999 he identified four main themes for the Millennium Assembly. The second was ‘development, including poverty eradication’. The shift that had been occurring in development over the 1990s, and confirmed at Copenhagen, was now being institutionalised. Development was no longer about national development (nation-building, economic growth and general improvements in welfare). Rather, it was synonymous with poverty eradication (or reduction).

Countries, international agencies, NGOs, networks and activists energetically began to try and shape the content of the Millennium Assembly and Declaration. Getting into the Declaration would create an unprecedented opportunity – if ‘your goal’ was in

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11 This was the UK government’s mechanism for results-based management.
the Declaration then it would automatically be on the agenda at national and international meetings for years to come. For the UN and Kofi Annan the Millennium Assembly had to be successful. The international community must start the new millennium mobilised to take action on global problems beyond security. Closer to home, the UN had to show its value to its members and elicit a commitment from them to support genuine efforts at UN reform. No attention diverting disagreements should distract the media at the Summit.

Waves of formal/official and informal/unofficial meetings were conducted from mid-1999 onwards. The results of these consultations were to inform a pre-Summit report that Annan had promised member states. Its drafting team was led by Annan’s senior advisor, John Ruggie. This report would be the basis for a final round of negotiations to determine what went into the Declaration. On 3 April 2000 Annan launched *We the Peoples: the Role of the United Nations in the 21st Century*. Poverty eradication was the leading issue for the Report (Annan, 2000). Its first section focused on ‘freedom from want’ and the first point in its conclusion argued that ‘…we must spare no effort to free our fellow men and women from abject and dehumanising poverty…’. Being a UN publication, this document was very different from the DAC’s *Shaping the 21st Century*. It was much longer and covered a much wider range of topics. It was also less coherent than the DAC document12.

More significantly, for agencies concerned with global poverty reduction, it had a quite different set of poverty reduction goals than the IDGs. A comparison of the goals prioritised in *We the Peoples* and those in *Shaping the 21st Century* reveals a number of goals do not appear or are watered down (the ‘losers’). Others appear on Annan’s listing but not in the DAC listing (the ‘winners’). There are three big losers – gender equality and women’s empowerment, reproductive health and, more generally the goals for the health sector. Arguably, the ‘winners’ were economic growth, technology, the setting of goals for the rich countries, the environment and highlighting Africa’s problems (see Hulme 2008 for a full discussion).

- **Gender equality and women’s empowerment:** *We the Peoples* does not explicitly identify these as goals. Gender equality is subsumed under the educational target. A small but powerful set of interests (see below) appear to have persuaded Annan and/or his advisors from including these as explicit goals.
- **Reproductive health:** Reproductive health goals were omitted from *We the Peoples*. Despite the ‘paradigm shift’ being agreed at the International Conference on Population and Development (ICPD), reaffirmed at the Women’s Summit and at the 1999 UN General Assembly, it failed to make the document. Effective networking between the Vatican and conservative Islamic countries (Sudan, Libya and Iran)13 meant that the G77 (the UN’s informal association of developing countries with around 130 members) ‘…was internally split on the issue but opted for a consensus that would not offend its most conservative members’ (Crossette, 2004, p. 3). Annan was not prepared to risk weakening G77 support for the Millennium Declaration.
- **Health issues:** Health issues appeared in *We the Peoples* but in a very limited form. Quite what happened – why the declarations of the 1990s

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12 For *We the Peoples*, identifying the precise priorities is difficult, as the executive summary identifies six poverty reduction priorities, while the conclusion lists eight (or 12 if you include goals for rich countries).

13 For discussions of this alliance see Crossette (2004), Hulme (2008), Sen (2005) and Standing (2004).
had so little influence is unclear. Amazingly, the agreements to reduce child and infant mortality and maternal mortality were not included.

- **Economic growth:** In *We the Peoples* economic growth receives a much greater focus than one might have expected given the resolutions from UN conferences of the 1990s.

- **Goals for rich countries:** Within *We the Peoples* is an initial statement of what would become Goal 8 of the MDGs. The executive summary identifies the priority of ‘Demonstrating global solidarity: Rich countries must further open their markets to poor countries products, must provide deeper and faster debt relief, and must give more and better focused development assistance…’ (*ibid*, p. 2). This emphasis on what the rich world must do stood in stark contrast to DAC’s IDGs. The G77, and particularly India, argued that the Millennium Declaration must be more balanced.

- **Technology:** Technology gets a high profile as the seventh, of the eight, poverty goals recommended to the Summit. This seems to be partly based on Ruggie’s (2001, p. 44) personal enthusiasm for IT, partly on timing (early 2000 was the peak for hype about the internet and the ‘new economy’) and partly because IT did not have a strong interest group objecting to it.

- **Sustainable development and the environment:** *We the Peoples* took this forward powerfully with a full chapter and a recommendation for the Kyoto Protocol to be ratified by 2002.

- **HIV/AIDS:** While health issues generally lost out there was one clear winner – HIV/AIDS. A Martian reading the final chapter of *We the Peoples* could reasonably conclude that HIV/AIDS was the only health problem facing the Earth’s poor people. Annan’s personal belief that tackling HIV/AIDS was essential for global poverty reduction appears to have driven this emphasis14.

- **Africa:** In the report Africa is singled out as needing particular attention. This is no surprise, given the continent was now concluding its second ‘lost decade’ and African leaders were discussing pan-African initiatives to ‘kick start’ economic growth across the continent.

Two points should be noted from this comparison. First, the goals identified in *We the Peoples* had less of a human development focus than the IDGs. The capabilities of child, maternal and reproductive health and gender equality were much less evident. Second, although Ruggie (2001, p. 47) is an RBM enthusiast, the goals in *We the Peoples* were less RBM compliant than the IDGs. The need for the UN document to satisfy, or at least not annoy, a broad constituency meant that the application of RBM principles was constrained.

**(b) Setting Global Poverty Reduction Goals: A Two Track Process**

*We the Peoples* provided a strong indication of the most progressive agreement that Annan and his advisors thought the Millennium Summit would reach. But apart from keeping the UN’s member states on board, Annan needed to find a way of demonstrating that the UN was coordinating its global poverty reduction activities with the other big players – the World Bank, IMF and the OECD’s bilateral agencies. These organisations appreciated the constraints operating on Annan – but many, if not most of their staff, felt that the IDG listing had distinct advantages over *We the* 

Peoples. It was shorter, more coherent and had detailed, technically-sound ‘indicators’. The need for the leading agencies in global poverty reduction to demonstrate they were working together led to an unprecedented show of solidarity. In June 2000 the leaders of the four major development multilaterals launched A Better World for All: Progress towards the international development goals (BWFA, 2000). The document was carefully presented to show that there was no lead agency – agencies were listed alphabetically as were the signatures of their leaders.

This document re-iterated the DAC’s 1996 IDGs almost exactly. It re-affirmed the primacy of results-based management thinking: ‘The goals are set in precise terms – measured in numbers to ensure accountability… our institutions are actively using these development goals as a common framework to guide our policies and programmes and to assess our effectiveness’ (ibid, pp. 2-3). Most significantly, the goals in BWFA included reproductive rights and reduced child and maternal mortality – human development goals that We the Peoples had omitted.

Beyond its content A Better World for All revealed an important aspect of the global poverty reduction goal setting process – it was a twin track process. The OECD was continuing with its efforts and had support from the IFIs. In parallel the UN was mounting a similar exercise to produce a list from the Millennium Summit.

(c) From We the Peoples to the Millennium Declaration

Over summer 2000 there were frantic negotiations about what should finally go into the Millennium Declaration. The position of the OECD (and virtually all of its members) and of the IFIs was clear – they would like to see the IDGs as the poverty goals in the Declaration. For other parties – UN member states of the ‘south’, NGOs, social movements, private businesses – preferences varied with their interests and values. Networks of many different types – formally structured and loose coalitions, single issue and multiple issue, conservative and radical – pursued multiple channels (the media, formal meetings with UN civil servants, marches in national capitals, cups of tea with Annan) to advance their viewpoint. Only fragments of the myriad of overt and covert final negotiations are public knowledge. By contrasting the concrete goals identified in We the Peoples and the Millennium Declaration a partial understanding of the processes can be gained.

To reach last minute compromises on contentious issues the UN civil servants involved appear to have used a subtle device. They divided the poverty reduction resolutions in the Declaration into two paragraphs. Paragraph 19 – ‘We resolve further’ – listed goals on which agreement had been reached. These could go forward to the plan of action (the Secretary-General’s Road Map) following the Millennium Assembly. Paragraph 20 – ‘We also resolve’ – listed goals that were on the UN agenda but not actionable unless the objections of some member-states

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15 OECD statisticians had by now defined a set of indicators that would show progress toward the IDGs. As these progressed they were refined into a hierarchy of goals, targets and indicators.

16 The focus here is on the ‘development and poverty eradication’ goals and not the entire document.

17 See Hulme (2008) for details of these fragments.

18 Interviews with UN employees confirm that this technique is one that is used to reach agreements.
could be overcome in future negotiations. Hulme (2008) provides a full comparison of the changes. Here only highlights are presented:

- **Gender equality and women’s empowerment** – this issue made some progress by being included in paragraph 20. It would not be an implementation priority but it was back on the agenda.

- **Infant, child and maternal mortality** – the inclusion of these goals was the most dramatic change between *We the Peoples* and the Millennium Declaration. Even the strong concerns of the Vatican and conservative Islamic states were overcome.

- **Major diseases** – *We the Peoples* sole focus on HIV/AIDS was broadened to include ‘malaria and other major diseases’. Health professionals were successful in arguing that focussing only on HIV/AIDS would impact negatively on overall health status.

- **Benefits of new technology** – this goal slipped from the main listing to paragraph 20.

- **Goals for rich countries** – The goals from *We the Peoples* are included in the *Millennium Declaration* (paragraphs 15, 16 and 20). To meet the Summit deadline and avoid confrontation it was agreed that negotiation around these would be deferred until a ‘High-level International and Intergovernmental Event on Financing for Development’ in 2001.

- **Decent work for youth** – This goal slipped from the main list to paragraph 20. The omission of a ‘decent work for all’ goal in the Declaration (and MDGs) is partly explained by ineffective strategy in the 1990s by the ILO and transnational labour organisations (Hulme, 2008).

The additions, deletions, repositioning of items and compromises discussed above worked, and the Millennium Declaration was unanimously approved on 8th September 2000. The Secretary-General and UN could breathe a sigh of relief. The Millennium Assembly had been a success – the global media had reported in positive terms, UN reform appeared to have been sanctioned and the Declaration contained the materials for a final, authoritative set of global poverty reduction goals.

The next formal stage of the process was for the Secretary-General to draw up a ‘road map’ showing how the world would achieve global poverty reduction. It was now time to finalise the content of the goals; prepare for the Finance for Development Summit; organise a mechanism for a global plan and for national plans; and develop a mechanism to strengthen public support for global poverty reduction.

6. A brief history of the MDGs: Phase 4 – from New York to Monterrey

(a) **Concordance: from Millennium Declaration to Millennium Development Goals**

Before the UN could develop a plan for implementing the Millennium Declaration it needed final agreement on what the exact goals and targets were. The Declaration provided a variety of resolutions, scattered around four different paragraphs, but not a precise statement in RBM terms.

The UK continued with its self-appointed global leadership role. In February 2001 Gordon Brown and Clare Short convened a meeting to advance the ‘child poverty’ goals. They did well, as it was attended by all the leading players. This was a positive event building on what Mark Malloch Brown (2001), head of UNDP, called the ‘new consensus’ created by the Millennium Declaration.
The UN’s statisticians were already liaising with co-professionals at the DAC in Paris about indicators and sources of data. In several areas DAC statisticians were ahead of them, having started in 1996. As the UN agencies had to follow the Declaration, and as the OECD saw no reason to drop the IDGs (and had UN, World Bank and IMF agreement on them) there were two possible ways that the twin-track process might run.

1. **Continue with a twin track process.** This would mean that the UN and OECD both got their own way but would make the job of programming global poverty reduction (plans, structures, monitoring) complex for implementing agencies and confusing for politicians and publics.

2. **Reconcile the two sets of goals.** This was the logical thing to do but was problematic. How could Annan explain to the General Assembly that he had modified the agreement that 189 countries had reached? On the other hand, why should the OECD change the IDGs – in June 2000 the UN, World Bank and IMF had endorsed them?

This issue came to a head in March 2001 at a World Bank convened meeting attended by more than 200 delegates from the multilaterals, bilateral donors and more than a dozen developing countries. Malloch Brown’s opening address sparked off negotiations about the IDGs and what he carefully termed the ‘Millennium Declaration Goals/Targets’. His talk was a pitch to the Bank and IMF – the UN would accept IFI authority over national poverty reduction strategies (PRSPs) if the IFIs would support a listing of targets and indicators derived from the Millennium Declaration by the UN Secretariat.

‘Just as the Bank and Fund have clear strengths in driving the PRSP process, I think the UN system can build on the real momentum of the Millennium Summit and Declaration and play an invaluable role in helping develop a new campaign at global, national and even community level to monitor and benchmark outcomes’ (Malloch Brown, 2001, p. 3).

Bradford (2006, p. 4) felt that Malloch Brown was not outlining his proposal in full: ‘…the seven IDGs were being left out all together, or at the very least being relegated to a secondary position…’. He was not the only person to notice this. As Malloch Brown finished Howard Hjort, the FAO’s representative rose.

I notice that Mark Malloch Brown has spoken of the consensus on the International Development Goals, but then went on to speak about the Millennium Goals. I am sure that everybody knows that there is a fundamental and significant difference between the Millennium Goals and the International Development Targets. My question is will the International Development Goals be modified… to conform to the Millennium Goals? (Miller Reporting Company, 2001, pp. 41-42).

Malloch Brown’s response was dismissive of the IDGs:

…my view is that the International Development Goals were a step towards a process which has now culminated with a unique act of endorsement… at the Millennium Summit… my view is that it is a step back to a less universally, less high-level endorsed set of goals (ibid, pp. 42-43).

Bradford countered with a defence of the IDGs, drawn from RBM.
...the advantage of the International Development Goals... is that they are few, they are concrete, they are monitorable, and they are achievable... If necessary we could put together a task force which could attempt to reconcile the Goals... it doesn't take too much intellectual work to figure out how to make them concordant... what we don't want to do is to give on the outside, especially to our parliaments, any sense that we don’t have our act pulled together behind something very, very clear and finite and specifically focused (ibid, pp. 44-5).

Subsequently Bradford circulated a handwritten note arguing that ‘concordance’ would be relatively straightforward (Table 1).
Table 1 ‘Concordance’ – Reconciling the IDGs and Millennium Declaration Goals

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>International Development Goals</th>
<th>Millennium Declaration Goals</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Poverty Reduction</td>
<td>1 Poverty Reduction</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2 Water</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5 Slums</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6 Digital [divide]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Universal Primary Education</td>
<td>2 Education: Universal Primary education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Gender equality</td>
<td>3 Education: Gender Gap</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Infant and Child Mortality</td>
<td>4 Health: HIV/AIDS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Maternal Mortality</td>
<td>2 Water</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Reproductive Health</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Colin Bradford, photocopy of hand-written note

What happened in subsequent negotiations at this meeting is not documented but it is clear that agreements were reached. Malloch Brown’s proposal that there be a division of labour between the IFIs (PRSPs) and the UN (Millennium Goals) was carried forward. Bradford’s suggestion, that a task force be set up to reach concordance on the two sets of goals also went forward – with members from the DAC (representing OECD), World Bank, IMF and UNDP.

It was this task force that finalised the MDGs, in what was claimed to be a purely technical exercise, in Annan’s *Road map towards the implementation of the United Nations Millennium Declaration* (UN, 2001, p. 55). This authoritative listing was carefully qualified: ‘The list of millennium development goals does not undercut in any way agreements on other goals and targets reached at the global conferences of the 1990s’. So, with the publication of a four page annex (see Appendix 2 for an updated version) at the back of a 60 page document, the Millennium Development Goals were finally agreed – or at least almost agreed. There was a note stating that the indicators for Goal 7 (Ensure environmental sustainability) and Goal 8 (Develop a global partnership for development) were ‘subject to further refinement’. These were the goals that most affected the rich countries and they wanted some flexibility!

It is clear from the final form of the MDGs that the IDGs, as presented in *A Better World for All* (BWFA, 2000), were taken as the primary document. Points from the Millennium Declaration were subsequently negotiated into the IDGs and an objectionable IDG goal was removed. The exact reasons for the final negotiations reaching this position are not known, but there are clear logical grounds relating to the main arguments of this paper:

- The IDGs were coherent from a human development perspective. The majority were about capability enhancement and the first and last referred to essential ‘means’ for achieving human development. They were presentable. The goals in the Declaration lacked such coherence.
- The IDGs were already structured in RBM format – a short, clear list of measurables.
- The most powerful forces in these negotiations, both technically (the IMF and World Bank) and politically (the OECD’s members) preferred the IDGs.
Nevertheless, the negotiations had substance and there were winners and losers from an IDG perspective. The biggest loser was reproductive health. It was an explicit goal in the IDGs, and central to human development, but the UN could not entertain this because of the objections of a small part of its membership (see earlier). The compromise that was reached (an advance on the Millennium Declaration) was that ‘improved maternal health’ could remain on the list. By contrast, there were gains for the gender equality and women’s empowerment goal. It remained an explicit goal and its indicators were now extended into economic life and politics.

Other goals on the Millennium Declaration list were demoted for reasons derived from RBM principles. The AIDS orphans goal was converted into an MDG indicator for halting the spread of HIV/AIDS. Similarly, the Declaration’s ‘safe drinking water’ goal was demoted to MDG indicator status. The goal of improving the lives of 100 million slum dwellers was downgraded to an MDG target.

The Millennium Declaration did have one major impact on the IDG listing: the addition of Goal 8: a global partnership for development. The final MDG list included 7 targets and 17 indicators for Goal 8. Developing countries were not going to accept a set of goals that applied only to them. There had to be a goal indicating what the rich world would contribute to global poverty reduction. However, there was a qualitative difference between Goals 1 to 7 and Goal 8. While Goals 1 to 7 were time specific there were no concrete dates set for any goal 8 indicators and most of the indicators lacked a quantitative target (Fukuda-Parr, 2006). This reflected the power relations of the situation – the more powerful members of the OECD were prepared to agree the directions they should move in but they were not prepared to set quantitative targets or agree dates for achievement. They were too smart (and too powerful) to agree to the SMART goals demanded by RBM.

In his first Millennium Summit follow-up report (the Road Map) of 6 September 2001 Annan was able to unveil the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). Most UN members subsequently started to refer to these goals and many used them as part of their policy and planning processes. The main exceptions to this were the US and India.

(b) From the Road Map to Monterrey

Over the year following the Millennium Summit, prospects for a concerted push on global poverty reduction weakened. In part this was inevitable: the Millennium fever that had fuelled progress was over. More significant was the change of President in the US. Power now rested with a Republican President guided by a small group of neo-conservative advisors. Bush had hardly any foreign policy experience and neither he nor his advisors had been part of the UN conferences or IDG and MDG process. They were very suspicious of the UN and foreign aid. This was highly inauspicious for the approaching UN Finance for Development (FFD) Conference, now delayed until March 2002. At the FFD it was expected that UN members, and particularly rich countries, would make pledges to raise the level of resources available to achieve the MDGs. It seemed likely that Bush would not attend the FFD.

\[As \text{ late as 26 August 2005 the US Ambassador to the UN, John Bolton, wrote to his peers: the ‘United States supports the development goals of the Millennium Declaration…[but the] ‘Millennium Development Goals’…are a [UN] Secretariat product, which member states never formally ratified’.\]
Summit and possible that the USA would detach itself from the MDG process. Two sets of events helped change this – neither was planned.

The 9/11 attacks had profound effects on the USA and the world. Perhaps surprisingly, their short term impact on the progress of the MDGs was positive. In its haste to respond to this appalling event the Bush administration thought a little more than it had previously about ‘soft power’ approaches to foreign policy. It showed more interest in the role of US foreign aid as an adjunct to the ‘war on terror’.

Second was that the Finance for Development meeting was in Monterrey and the Mexican President, Vicente Fox, was convenor. Bush had already declared that Mexico was the US’s most important foreign partner and talked about his close links with Fox. This put pressure on him to accept the invitation to Monterrey from his friend. As discussed in Hulme (2008) other factors (Bono, Christian conservatives, Condoleezza Rice outmanoeuvring Treasury Secretary O’Neill) also encouraged Bush to attend – and once there he would have to show generosity. So, while the commitments made at Monterrey were well below the levels talked about in 2000, and many rich countries had caveats around their aid, trade and debt reforms, overall the FFD was a success. The MDGs were informally approved there (even if not formally ratified) and Bush promised that the USA would be part of the project for global poverty reduction that the MDGs represented. The MDGs were now ready for implementation.

7. Human development, results-based management and the MDGs

Human development and results-based management are strange bedfellows coming out of two very different intellectual traditions. Yet, as revealed in earlier sections, both played leading ideational roles in the complex and sprawling processes that produced the MDGs. Their forms of influence differed greatly, however. RBM was applied to the MDGs in a very direct fashion. At times goals, targets and indicators were screened for how ‘SMART’ they were and judgements made on RBM principles impacted directly on MDG form and content. Human development had a much more diffuse influence. The idea contributed, consciously and unconsciously, to the thinking of many of those involved in the processes leading to the MDGs. But, they were not applied directly.\(^{20}\)

While the idea of human development provided general support for UN conferences and associated declarations it promoted two specific intellectual components that were to underpin the MDGs. First, it advanced the case that development strategies needed to directly pursue the goals of development, and not just the means. Human development provided an overarching conceptual framework for arguing that education and health improvements and gender equality were not only good in their own right, but were essential components for the pursuit of a dynamic vision of development. In crude terms, five and a half of the eight MDGs are about enhancing human capabilities.

Secondly, when the convenors of the Social Summit, the DAC and the UN drew up lists of goals, they could explicitly or implicitly argue that a list was needed as development and poverty reduction were multi-dimensional. Lists of goals were not mere ‘shopping lists’, reflecting a failure to analyse problems and select priorities (a criticism that had partly undermined ‘basic needs’ in the 1980s). Rather, a list of

\(^{20}\) I can find no record of any attempt to specify exactly what human development was and then directly try to shape the MDGs in terms of that specification.
multiple goals was essential for any serious development effort based on rigorous thinking.

While the processes behind the placing of items on such lists involved complex interactions of ideas, empirical evidence, interests and values, human development provided a well-reasoned case for multi-dimensional lists. There was a common sense dimension to such a case but, in the background, were the works of Amartya Sen melding economics with philosophy to argue for the promotion of capabilities and freedoms. His name, along with others, could be cited in an iconic fashion to show that a deep theoretical resource lay behind such lists. This enhanced the legitimacy of the IDG and MDG exercises and added to their argumentative strength.

But, ideas are only part of the story. Interests moderated the influence of human development on the MDGs. At the DAC, delegates realised that a multi-dimensional list made it easier to enlist the support of issue-based NGOs. Having educational, gender, health, HIV/AIDS and environmental goals meant that specialist NGOs – children, gender, HIV/AIDS, family planning, water, and conservation – would find one of their organisational goals on the list. So, having a multi-dimensional list also had political advantages. On a more negative note, the human development arguments for reproductive health were challenged by the concerns of the Vatican and conservative Islamic states and the reproductive health goal disappeared during the negotiations in 2001 that finalised the MDGs.

The ideational adjunct to human development was results-based management. In the 1990s RBM was on the ascendant in Business and Management Schools and in the pronouncements of politicians and senior public servants, especially in the rich world. Its common sense nature and linearity added to its attraction – set targets, monitor achievement and reward staff on the basis of performance. It was adopted across the public sector in Australia, Canada, Germany, New Zealand, the UK and USA and in the systems of many development agencies (e.g. CIDA, DFID, GTZ, NORAD, UNICEF and USAID). For the aid-financed programmes of the DAC and UN it was particularly attractive. The widely reported underperformance of aid in earlier years would not occur in the future as RBM methods would ensure high levels of performance.

RBM and particularly its tenet of SMART measures (stretching, measurable, agreed, realistic and time-limited) influenced the MDGs in three main ways. First, it determined the structure of the MDGs and explains why they are a nested hierarchy of goals, targets and indicators focused on time-bound policy ‘outcomes’. Second, it shaped the specification of goals. While determining exactly what is ‘stretching’ but also ‘realistic’ is not an exact science one sees this tenet in operation with the $1 a day poverty target. At Copenhagen this was set as ‘eradicating’ extreme poverty by 2015. When the DAC applied its RBM thinking to this target it was reduced to the more achievable ‘halve the proportion’ of the extreme poor by 2015. Finally, the idea of RBM meant that the MDGs avoided potentially difficult to measure goals like human rights and participation. These could be placed in the introductions and conclusions of documents such as Shaping the 21st Century and the Road Map, but not in the lists that are to guide action. As a result the variety of human development that impacted on the MDGs was more akin to basic needs than human rights.

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21 This was enhanced when he won the 1998 Nobel Prize for Economics.
22 A growing literature in the US and UK is critical of the impacts of RBM and performance management on public service delivery (see Radin, 2006).
23 Though do note that critics of the MDGs argue that this meant that targets were no longer as stretching as they should have been.
As discussed earlier, political interests moderated the full application of RBM. This is most obvious for Goal 8. The idea of RBM was rigorously pursued for goals 1 to 6 and partially applied to Goal 7. However, it was systematically avoided for Goal 8. While the like-minded group might be willing to agree to 0.7% of GDP to be provided in aid by 2015 (they had already achieved this) the US and Japan were certainly not going to agree to that. Interests took precedence over ideas.

8. Conclusions: MDG coherence and the ‘hiding hand’

The MDGs are the world’s biggest promise – committing 189 states and all of the world’s main multilateral agencies to an unprecedented effort to reduce multidimensional poverty through a global partnership. Many ideas have influenced their content and form. This paper has argued that two ideas were particularly important: human development and results-based management.

But, the form and content of the MDGs was not argued out in a global university seminar room. The promotion and obstruction of specific points, and the ways in which they were interpreted, depended on the values and interests of key actors at key events and over longer periods of time. Nation states and multilateral organisations often dominated formal discussions, but behind their deliberations were the actions of large numbers of networks (of organisations and individuals) forming shifting and often poorly-defined coalitions and alliances. The ambivalence of the USA to the MDG-evolutionary process meant that less powerful states, most obviously the UK, took on global leadership roles. The concerns of religious conservatives (Roman Catholic, Evangelical Christians and Islamic) about reproductive issues meant that such groups played a significant role in MDG processes.

Core components of human development – gender equality, child survival, maternal survival and others – were argued on and off the evolving lists of UN conference declarations, the IDGs, the Millennium Declaration and the Road Map’s MDGs. In a similar fashion, the principles of RBM were applied in different ways to different MDG goals: specific, time-bound goals were fine for poor countries but for rich countries they were assiduously avoided.

With the wisdom of hindsight, the coherence of the MDGs – economic well-being, social development, environmental sustainability and a global partnership – seems remarkable given the processes from which they emerged. Perhaps a ‘hiding hand’, guides not only some development projects but also elements of global public policy over the long term. As Hirschman writes (1967, pp. 13-5):

…since we necessarily underestimate our creativity, it is desirable that we underestimate to a roughly similar extent the difficulties of the tasks we face so as to be tricked by these two offsetting underestimates into undertaking tasks that we can, but otherwise would not dare, tackle…our more lofty achievements, such as economic, social, or political progress, could have come about by stumbling rather than through careful planning, rational behaviour, and the courageous taking up of a clearly perceived challenge.

Whether the creativity unleashed by the MDGs will deliver improved lives for the world’s poorest people remains to be seen.
References


Appendix 1: International Development Goals

1. Economic well-being: The proportion of people living in extreme poverty in developing countries should be reduced by at least one-half by 2015.

2. Social development: There should be substantial progress in primary education, gender equality, basic health care and family planning, as follows:
   a) There should be universal primary education in all countries by 2015.
   b) Progress toward gender equality and the empowerment of women should be demonstrated by eliminating gender disparity in primary and secondary education by 2005.
   c) The death rate for infants and children under the age of five years should be reduced in each developing country by two-thirds the 1990 level by 2015. The rate of maternal mortality should be reduced by three-fourths during this same period.
   d) Access should be available through the primary health-care system to reproductive health services for all individuals of appropriate ages, including safe and reliable family planning methods, as soon as possible and no later than the year 2015.

3. Environmental sustainability and regeneration: There should be a current national strategy for sustainable development, in the process of implementation, in every country by 2005, so as to ensure that current trends in the loss of environmental resources – forests, fisheries, fresh water, climate, soils, biodiversity, stratospheric ozone, the accumulation of hazardous substances and other major indicators – are effectively reversed at both global and national levels by 2015.

### Appendix 2: The Millennium Development Goals

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Goals and Targets</th>
<th>Indicators</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Goal 1: Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger</strong></td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>
| Target 1: Halve, between 1990 and 2015, the proportion of people whose income is less than one dollar a day | 1. Proportion of population below $1 per day  
2. Poverty gap ratio (incidence x depth of poverty  
3. Share of poorest quintile in national consumption |
| Target 2: Halve, between 1990 and 2015, the Proportion of people who suffer from hunger | 4. Prevalence of underweight children (under five years of age)  
5. Proportion of population below minimum level of dietary energy consumption |
| **Goal 2: Achieve universal primary education** |  |
| Target 3: Ensure that, by 2015, children everywhere, boys and girls alike, will be able to complete a full course of primary schooling | 6. Net enrolment ratio in primary education  
7. Proportion of pupils starting grade 1 who reach grade 5  
8. Literacy rate of 15-24 year olds |
| **Goal 3: Promote gender equality and empower women** |  |
| Target 4: Eliminate gender disparity in primary and secondary education, preferably by 2005, and to all levels of education no later than 2015 | 9. Ratio of girls to boys in primary, secondary and tertiary education  
10. Ratio of literate females to males of 15-to-24-year-olds  
11. Share of women in wage employment in the non-agricultural sector  
12. Proportion of seats held by women in national parliament |
| **Goal 4: Reduce child mortality** |  |
| Target 5: Reduce by two thirds, between 1990 and 2015, the under-five mortality rate | 13. Under-five mortality rate  
14. Infant mortality rate  
15. Proportion of 1-year-old children immunized against measles |
| **Goal 5: Improve maternal health** |  |
| Target 6: Reduce by three quarters, between 1990 and 2015, the maternal mortality ratio | 16. Maternal mortality ratio  
17. Proportion of births attended by skilled health personnel |
**Goal 6: Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases**

| Target 7: Have halted by 2015 and begun to reverse the spread of HIV/AIDS | 18. HIV prevalence among 15-to-24-year-old pregnant women  
19. Contraceptive prevalence rate  
20. Number of children orphaned by HIV/AIDS |
|---|---|

| Target 8: Have halted by 2015 and begun to reverse the incidence of malaria and other major diseases | 21. Prevalence and death rates associated with malaria  
22. Proportion of population in malaria risk areas using effective malaria prevention and treatment measures  
23. Prevalence and death rates associated with tuberculosis  
24. Proportion of tuberculosis cases detected and cured under directly observed treatment short course |
|---|---|

**Goal 7: Ensure environmental sustainability**

| Target 9: Integrate the principles of sustainable development into country policies and programmes and reverse the loss of environmental resources | 25. Proportion of land area covered by forest  
26. Land area protected to maintain biological diversity  
27. GDP per unit of energy use (as a proxy for energy efficiency)  
28. Carbon dioxide emissions (per capita)  
[Plus two figures of global atmospheric pollution: ozone depletion and the accumulation of global warming gases] |
|---|---|

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Target 10: Halve, by 2015, the proportion of people without sustainable access to safe drinking water.</th>
<th>29. Proportion of population with sustainable access to an improved water source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

| Target 11: By 2020, to have achieved a significant improvement in the lives of at least 100 million slum dwellers | 30. Proportion of people with access to improved sanitation  
31. Proportion of people with access to secure tenure  
[Urban/rural disaggregation of several of the above indicators may be relevant for monitoring improvement in the lives of slum dwellers] |
|---|---|
Goal 8: Develop a global partnership for development

Target 12: Develop further an open, rule-based, predictable, non-discriminatory trading and financial system
Includes a commitment to good governance, development, and poverty reduction – both nationally and internationally

Target 13: Address the special needs of the least developed countries
Includes: tariff and quota free access for least developed countries’ exports; enhanced programme of debt relief for HIPCs and cancellation of official bilateral debt; and more generous ODA for countries committed to poverty reduction

Target 14: Address the special needs of landlocked countries and small island developing states
(through the Programme of Action for the Sustainable Development of Small Island Developing States and the outcome of the twenty-second special session of the General Assembly).

Target 15: Deal comprehensively with the debt problems of developing countries through national and international measures in order to make debt sustainable in the long term

Target 16: In cooperation with developing countries, develop and implement strategies for decent and productive work for youth.

Target 17: In cooperation with pharmaceutical companies, provide access to affordable, essential drugs in developing countries.

[Some of the indicators listed below will be monitored separately for the least developed countries (LDCs), Africa, landlocked countries and small island developing states]

Official development assistance
32. Net ODA as percentage of OECD/DAC donors’ gross national product (targets of 0.7% in total and 0.15% for LDCs)
33. Proportion of ODA to basic social services (basic education, primary health care, nutrition, safe water and sanitation)
34. Proportion of ODA that is untied
35. Proportion of ODA for environment in small island developing states
36. Proportion of ODA for transport sector in landlocked countries

Market Access
37. Proportion of export (by value and excluding arms) admitted free of duties and quotas
38. Average tariffs and quotas on agricultural products and textiles and clothing
39. Domestic and export agricultural subsidies in OECD countries
40. Proportion of ODA provided to help build trade capacity

Debt Sustainability
41. Proportion of bilateral HIPC debt cancelled
42. Debt service as a percentage of exports of goods and services
43. Proportion of ODA provided as debt relief
44. Number of countries reaching HIPC decisions and completion points
45. Unemployment rate of 15-to-24-year-olds
46. Proportion of population with access to affordable essential drugs on a sustainable basis
47. Telephone lines per 1,000 people
48. Personal computers per 1,000 people
Target 18: In cooperation with the private sector, make available the benefits of new technologies, especially information and communications.

[Other indicators to be decided]

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