



“Why would they care?”

Incentivizing Energy Efficiency in the Public Sector

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OUTLINE



- **What's the problem?**
- **Five types of solutions**
 - **From increased visibility (“consumption feedback”) to savings retention**
- **What makes most sense?**
 - **Discussion**



Heart of the Problem



“Most government agencies don't pay attention because they don't have to pay for electricity or gas. Why would they care?”

*Dr. Prassert Sinsukprassert
Government of Thailand*



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Classic EE Problem



- **“Principal-agent” conflict or “split incentive”**
 - Tenant responsible for paying utility bills
 - Landlord responsible for buying energy-using equipment (for lighting, heating, cooling, etc.)
 - Typical result: Landlord buys least costly (and usually least efficient) equipment
 - BUT: tenant exhibits energy-saving behavior – e.g., turns off lights, keeps thermostat low (in heating season), etc.
- **Resolving obvious conflict may yield another**
 - Landlord pays utility bills – “gross” lease
 - Landlord also responsible for buying equipment
 - Typical result: Landlord buys more efficient eqpt.
 - BUT: tenant does not exhibit energy-saving behavior – e.g., leaves lights on, keeps thermostat high, etc.



Solving the Incentive Problem



- **Raised visibility – “consumption feedback”**
- **“Scoring”**
 - **For agencies, facilities, and employees**
- **Recognition and awards**
 - **Large and small**
- **Cost assignment/allocation**
- **Savings retention**



Raising Visibility



- **Are building operators aware of how much they use?**
 - If not, it's like trying to go on a diet without a scale
- **Simple consumption feedback can help**
 - Studies of indirect (i.e., after-the-fact) feedback such as providing information from bill show anywhere between 1-10% savings
 - Best results from bills with:
 - comparison to same month in prior year
 - graphical presentation of information



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Raising Visibility



- **Comparative feedback seems to help**
 - *In situ* study of two worker teams in metallurgy co.:
 - both teams cut energy consumption after feedback, BUT:
 - team that received information about other team did better
 - savings in both teams persisted six mos. after program
 - U.S. corporation energy head distributed monthly energy use and cost of major facilities to all facility managers
 - Facility managers could view own, and others', usage
 - None had never seen bill information before
 - Claim: nearly 10% savings (US\$3 million) in first year
- **Competitive element also beneficial**
 - Oberlin College: two-wk. competition among dorms
 - Average savings – 31%; w/ real-time feedback – 55%



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“Scoring”



- **Beyond consumption feedback, consider rating agencies, facilities, and even employees**
 - **U.S. watchdog agency grades the agencies each year: grades are green, yellow, and red**
 - FEMP collects data from agencies and prepares cover letter; Office of Management and Budget assigns grades
 - Mid-year progress reports with goals also
 - For '07, 8 agencies went up (four from red to green), 1 down
 - **U.S. agencies are directed by Executive Order 13123 (1999) to include successful implementation of energy goals in performance evaluations of:**
 - Agency heads, heads of field offices, principal program mgrs., facility and energy managers, other members of agency energy team, and others as appropriate
 - 23 of 25 agencies have shown some compliance



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Recognition and Awards



- **Recognizing good performance can be very motivating**
- **FEMP Annual Awards:**
 - ~ 25 different awards, both for groups and individuals (over 100 recipients); awards used to be financial – nice plaques now
 - High-level speakers (Secretaries, Asst. Secs.) at elegant site
 - Evening cocktail reception, awards ceremony lunch next day
 - Program sustained for over 20 years (and still going)
- **NYC Housing Authority: Gold star stickers to boiler operators who saved fuel**
 - Operators who met monthly performance target based on previous year's use (adjusted for weather) received seal
 - Very popular: "I stopped giving them out in 1985 for a while and they started calling me and asking, 'Hey, where's our seal?' They plaster the walls with them."



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Cost Allocation



- **Make energy users into energy payers**
 - **Meter buildings and even departments separately and assign them bill-paying responsibility**
 - Latter may become too expensive and difficult to administer, but former is usually not
 - **U.S. hospitality company: installed sub-metering at major facility and began allocating costs to users**
 - 5% reduction goal exceeded without other interventions
- **Or make buyers of equipment pay energy bills**
 - **Modena, Italy: Group in charge of buying energy-using equipment is also responsible for energy bills**
 - large savings documented, but many other initiatives implemented at same time



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Savings Retention



- **Let facilities share in savings**
 - i.e., do not reduce utility budgets by amount of previous year's savings
- **U.S. Government: 100% is policy (EPACT-'05)**
 - savings must be used for energy/water projects
 - compliance unclear
- **Modena, Italy: 50/50 arrangement with several city schools**
 - Savings > 15% but ESCOs have worked on most buildings simultaneously so effect hard to tell
 - surpluses beyond payment to ESCO have resulted in annual payments to schools of 200 – 10,000 Euro



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What is best?



- **None of five approaches are mutually exclusive**
 - For example, U.S. hospitality company used consumption feedback and cost allocation
 - In fact, all five could be implemented together
- **Consumption feedback to metered facilities is easy first step**
- **At least limited recognition of high performers is a low-cost step with good returns likely**
 - Remember the gold stars
- **Some savings retention (e.g., 50%) is intuitively reasonable and obviously motivating**